In this appendix we provide more extensive proofs of results in the main paper. In particular we explicitly prove results that are direct adaptations of arguments from Atkeson and Lucas (1995) and hence omitted in the main paper
1 Proofs 1
Optimal Policies Induce E¢cient Allocations
In this subsection we prove our claim in Section 3.1 of the main text that a stationary allocation fh t (w 0 ; y t )g 1 t=0 is e¢cient if it is induced by an optimal policy (h; fg y 0 g) from the functional equation (16) with R > 1 and satis…es the resource constraint with equality.
The …rst step is to …nd an operational way to solve for e¢cient allocations, which will then lead us to the recursive problem (16): Consider the problem of a social planner faced with a sequence of intertemporal shadow prices fR t g 1 t=0
to minimize the value of resources needed to deliver expected discounted utility ¤ We would like to thank Andrew Atkeson for helpful discussions. All errors are our own 1 Equation numbers refer to equations in the main paper, unless they are preceded by an A; in which case they refer to equations in this appendix.
of w 0 to an individual with initial endowment given by y 0 . The planner chooses fh t (w 0 ; y t )g 1 t=0 to solve the problem W (w 0 ; y 0 )
= min
C(h t (w 0 ; y t ))¼(y t jy 0 ) subject to (11), (12), and (13): One obtains the following Theorem 1 (Atkeson and Lucas (1995) ) If there exist allocations fh t (w 0 ; y t )g, shadow prices fR t g and distribution © 0 such that:
1. Given fR t g 1 t=0 , for each (w 0 ; y 0 ) 2supp(© 0 ); fh t (w 0 ; y t )g solves the planners' problem 2. Feasibility (Equation (14) ) holds with equality for every t 3.
Then the allocation is e¢cient with respect to © 0 .
Proof. To show e¢ciency we …rst need to show that fh t (w 0 ; y t )g is constrained feasible with respect to © 0 : By assumption the allocation satis…es feasibility, equation (14) , and since it solves the planners' problem it also satis…es (11) ¡ (13): It is therefore constrained feasible. Now we need to show that there does not exist another allocation fĥ t (w 0 ; y t )g 1 t=0 that is constrained feasible with respect to © 0 and such that X y t Z C(ĥ t (w 0 ; y t ))¼(y t jy 0 )d© 0 < X y t Z C(ĥ t (w 0 ; y t ))¼(y t jy 0 )d© 0 for some t
Suppose this is the case. Since fh t (w 0 ; y t )g solves CP P for all w 0 ; y 0 we have
C(h t (w 0 ; y t ))¼(y t jy 0 )
C(ĥ t (w 0 ; y t ))¼(y t jy 0 )
where the left hand side of equation (1) is …nite 2 . Integrating both sides of (A4) with respect to © 0 one …nds
R s ¶ X y t jy 0 C(h t (w 0 ; y t ))¼(y t jy 0 )
From the fact that for fh t (w 0 ; y t )g feasibility holds with equality for all t; that nĥ t (w 0 ; y t ) o is constrained feasible and from (A3) one obtains:
Z C(ĥ t (w 0 ; y t ))¼(y t jy 0 )d© 0 · X y t jy0 Z y t ¼(y t jy 0 )d© 0 = X y t jy0 Z C(h t (w 0 ; y t ))¼(y t jy 0 )d© 0
for all t with the inequality being strict for some t. Multiplying each inequality by the appropriate term
0 and summing over all t we obtain (A5), but with the inequality reversed and strict, a contradiction This theorem states that if we can …nd an allocation that solves the planners problem, for a sequence of su¢ciently high intertemporal prices fR t g 1 t=0 and satis…es the resource constraint with equality, then that allocation is e¢cient. In particular note that condition (A2) is satis…ed for a sequence of intertemporal prices satisfying R t = R > 1 for all t:
Now we show that an allocation3 = fĥ t (w 0 ; y t )g 1 t=0 induced by the optimal policies (h; fg y 0 g) from the recursive problem (16), with the additional constraints g y 0 · ¹ w solve the planners' problem for interest rates fR t g 1 t=0 constant at R. For this allocation be e¢cient we then only have to demonstrate that it satis…es the resource constraint with equality So for given (w 0 ; y 0 ) de…nê
and in general recursivelŷ
h t (w 0 ; ybe the allocation induced by the recursive policy rules. The constraints g y 0 · ¹ w assure thatŵ 
and U , for all w 0 2 W and all y 0 2 Y; the solution to the functional equation, V R satis…es
By Theorem 4.4 and 4.5 of Stokey et al. (1989) , which are applicable as V R is bounded on W and the sequence fŵ t (w 0 ; y t )g 3 The assumption of which are satis…ed as C(w)¸0; all w:
Step 1: Pick any allocation ¾ = fh t (w 0 ; y t )g 1 t=0 that satis…es (A15)¡A(17). De…ne w t (w 0 ; y t ) = U t (w 0 ; y t ; ¾): It is immediate from (A16) that (A13) is satis…ed. From the de…nition of U t (w 0 ; y t ; ¾) it follows that (A12) is satis…ed as well.
Step 2: Pick any allocation ¾ = fh t (w 0 ; y t )g 1 t=0 and fw t (w 0 ; y t )g 1 t=1 that satis…es (A12) and (A13). Since for all t; w t (w 0 ; y t ) · ¹ w from (A13), by using (A12) we see that the allocation satis…es (A17). Now for all allocations satisfying (17), and for all t w t (w 0 ; y t ) ¡ U t (w 0 ; y t ; ¾)¯=¯¯X This inequality is valid for all t and all s: Taking the limit with respect to s one obtains (by (A17) and (A13)) that w t (w 0 ; y t ) = U t (w 0 ; y t ; ¾) for all t: Hence (A12) implies that
and hence (A15) is satis…ed. For t¸1 (A16) is obviously satis…ed, and it is satis…ed for t = 0 by the assumption that w 0¸U Aut t (y t ): This proves that the allocation constructed from the policies of the functional equation solves the component planning problem with the additional constraint U t (w 0 ; y t ; ¾) · ¹ w: By Theorem 5 in the main text g y 0 (w) < ¹ w for all w 2 W: By construction (A8) this implies thatŵ t (w 0 ; y t ) < ¹ w and hence, asŵ t (w 0 ; y t ) = U t (w 0 ; y t ;3); the constraint is never binding. Since the constraint set associated with the social planners problem is convex, this implies that the allocation3 indeed solves the original planning problem for constant interest rates.
The previous result shows that allocations induced by optimal policies from the recursive problem (16) solve the social planners problem, for a constant sequence of intertemporal prices R t = R > 1: To show e¢ciency of the allocation it remains to be shown that, for the appropriate R; the allocation indeed satis…es the resource constraint with equality. This is the content of Sections 3.3 and 3.4 of the main text.
Theoretical Properties of the Recursive Problem
In this subsection we prove theoretical properties of the operator T R de…ned in equation (16): These properties are important to establish the main results of Section 3.2 of the main text, Lemmas 3 and 4 and Theorem 5.
Lemma 3 T R maps C(W ) into itself and is a contraction.
Proof. For every w 2 W the objective function in (16) is continuous in h; g y 0 and the constraint set is compact and non-empty; therefore the minimum exists. V is bounded and since h · h · ¹ h , C(h) is bounded as well. It follows that T R V is a bounded function. The fact that T R V is continuous follows from the Theorem of the maximum (note that the constraint set is continuous in w). It is also easy to show that since R > 1 the operator T R satis…es the hypotheses of Blackwell's theorem and thus is a contraction with modulus 1 R Corollary 4 For R > 1; the operator T R has a unique …xed point V R 2 C(W ) (i.e. V R is continuous and bounded) and for all v 0 2 C(A); jjT
with the norm being the sup-norm.
Proof. Follows directly from the fact that T R is a contraction mapping with modulus 1 R Lemma 5 V R is strictly increasing and strictly convex.
Proof. For the …rst part we note that C(W ) (together with the sup-norm) is a complete metric space and that the set of bounded continuous nondecreasing functions on W; C 0 (W ); is a closed subset of C(W ) and that the set of bounded continuous strictly increasing functions; C 00 (W ); satis…es C 00 (W ) ½ C 0 (W ): By Lemma 3 of this appendix T R is a contraction mapping. Hence by Corollary 1 of Stokey et al., p. 52, it is su¢cient to show that, whenever
Letĥ;ĝ y 0 be the optimal choices forŵ: The choices g y 0 =ĝ y 0 and h =ĥ ¡ŵ + w <ĥ are feasible for w and therefore
To prove that V R is convex we note that the set of bounded continuous convex functions, C 000 (W ) is a closed subset of C(W ). Again by Corollary 1 of Stokey et al., p. 52, it is su¢cient to show that if V R 2 C 000 (W ); then (T R V R ) is convex. So we have to show that for all w;ŵ 2 W with w 6 =ŵ; and all¸2 (0; 1); (T R V )(¸w + (1 ¡¸)ŵ) ·¸(T R V )(w) + (1 ¡¸)(T R V )(ŵ): Let ĥ ;ĝ y be the optimal choices forŵ and h; g y be the optimal choices for w and de…ne h¸=¸h + (1 ¡¸)ĥ; gy =¸g y + (1 ¡¸)ĝ y : Since h¸; gy are feasible for (¸w + (1 ¡¸)ŵ; y); and
by convexity of V and strict convexity of C:
Finally we want to show that the …xed point of T R ; V; is strictly convex on W . We know that V is convex, continuous and strictly increasing. These facts imply that V is di¤erentiable almost everywhere on W and that for the countable number of points at which V is not di¤erentiable, right hand derivatives V 0 + and left hand derivatives V 0 ¡ exist (although need not coincide). Now suppose that V is not strictly convex on W: Then there exists an interval I µ W such that V is linear on I: Take w; w 0 2 I with w < w 0 : From the envelope theorem for any solution fg y 0 (w)g ; fg y 0 (w 0 )g
for some a > 0: Hence there exists ¹ y such that
: From the …rst order conditions, combining with the envelope condition
By convexity of V and the fact that g ¹ y (w) < g ¹ y (w 0 ) it follows that
Repeating the above argument one shows that there exists interval I
with slope ag n ; for all n > 1:
and pick n such that ag n < d: Then for all w 2 I (n) ; using the envelope condition
Therefore h(w) < h; which is impossible. Hence V cannot contain a linear segment on W:
Lemma 6 For any strictly increasing and strictly convex function V 2 C(A); T R V is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly convex. The optimal policies h(w); g y 0 (w) are continuous, single-valued functions.
Proof. The fact that T R V is strictly increasing and strictly convex follows from the properties of V: The choice variables h and g y 0 are constrained to lie in compact and convex intervals, and by assumption the objective function is strictly convex. Hence the minimizers are unique. Since the constraint set is continuous in w; the theorem of the maximum applies and T R V is continuous and h(w); g y 0 (w) are upper hemicontinuous correspondences. Since h(w); g y 0 (w) are functions, they are continuous.
Lemma 7
The unique …xed point of T R is continuously di¤erentiable.
Proof. Consider the following sequence of functions fV n g 1 n=0 , de…ned recursively as:
From Corollary 4 of this appendix we know that this sequence converges uniformly to the unique …xed point V R of T R : Also Lemma 6 of this appendix assures that each V n is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly convex (as by assumption C possesses these properties) and that the associated policies h n (w) and g n y 0 (w) are continuous functions. From the envelope condition (21) we have (as C is continuously di¤erentiable by assumption) that each V n is differentiable and that this derivative is continuous, since h n¡1 (w) is a continuous function. Now we will establish that V R is continuously di¤erentiable.
From Lemmas 6, 5 and Corollary 4 of this appendix we know that each V n as well as V R are strictly convex and continuous and that the sequence fV n g 1 n=0
converges to V R uniformly. Also W is compact. Then by Theorem 3.8 of Stokey et al., p. 64, the sequences
converge uniformly to the optimal policies associated with V R ; h R (w) and g R y 0 (w); respectively. Therefore from equation (21) we conclude that (T R V n ) 0 converges to
These results assure that V R and the associated policies h; g y 0 have the properties asserted in Section 3.2 of the main text.
Continuity and Monotonicity of the Excess Demand Function
In this subsection we show that the excess demand function d(R), as de…ned in Section 3.4 of the main text, is continuous and increasing on (1; 1 ): We start with continuity. First we show that the value functions, as functions of R; are continuous in R:
Lemma 8 (Atkeson and Lucas (1995)) Let R 2 (1; 1 ) and fR n g 1 n=0 be a sequence satisfying R n 2 (1; 1 ) and lim n!1 R n = R: Then the sequence fV Rn g 1 n=0
converges uniformly to V R on [w; ¹ w]:
Proof. We have to show that
where
By the triangle inequality
Now the operator T R n is a contraction mapping on [w; ¹ w] with unique …xed point V Rn (see Corollary 1 of this appendix). Hence
For the second term in the sum we note that
Here the …rst inequality again follows from the triangle inequality and the second from the fact that T R n is a contraction mapping on [w; ¹ w] with modulus
where we used the fact that V R is the unique …xed point of T R : Hence lim n!1 jjT n R n V R ¡ V R jj = 0 if and only if lim n!1 jjT R n V R ¡ T R V R jj = 0; i.e. if the operator T R n is continuous in R n : To see that T Rn is in fact continuous in R n consider the following argument: for arbitraryŵ 2 [w; ¹ w] by the theorem of the maximum
Since [w; ¹ w] is a compact set and T Rn V R ; T R V R are continuous functions in w; we have
Hence both terms on the right hand side of (A29) converge to 0, which proves the result This result proves that V R is continuous in R: Next we show the same result with respect to the optimal policies g R y 0 : This is crucial since these policies induce the Markov process to which © R is the invariant measure, and to prove continuity of © R with respect to R one …rst has to show that g R y 0 is continuous in R:
Lemma
Proof. We have to show that for each " > 0 there exists N(") such that for all n¸N (") we have jg
We note that by the triangle inequality
Since the function g 
The previous two lemmas can be used to prove our …rst main result about the excess demand function d(:); namely continuity on (1; 
by the triangle inequality. The …rst term converges to zero (as n ! 1) as fV R n g 1 n=0 converges uniformly to V R ; the second term converges to zero as f© Rn g 1 n=0 converges weakly to © R and V R is a continuous and bounded function
The previous result establishes that the excess demand function varies continuously with R: Now we want to establish a result about the slope of the excess demand function. In order to prove this we …rst establish that future utility promises are increasing in the interest rate R:
Lemma 11 The optimal policies g R y 0 (w) are increasing in R and the optimal policy h R (w) is decreasing in R:
Proof. Let R >R: We want to show that h R (w) · hR(w) and g 
Note that as V R is strictly convex and di¤erentiable (by the argument in the proof to Lemma 7 in this appendix), so are all V n (again by the argument in the proof to Lemma 7). Let (h n ; g n y 0 ) be the optimal policies associated with V n ; i.e.
We prove by induction that for all n¸1; (again see Lemma 7), it then follows that g R y 0 (w)¸gR y 0 (w) (and the other two relations also hold for n replaced withR):
Step 1: Let n = 1 and …x w 2 [w; ¹ w]: Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that there exists y
Then from the respective …rst order conditions (note that 
It follows from the previous result that
Step 2: Suppose that (A40) ¡ (A42) are true for n ¡ 1: We want to show that (A40) ¡ (A42) are true for n: Again suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that there exists y 
Since V R and V 
and hence
a contradiction. It follows that for all y 0 2 Y; g
From promise keeping we have h n (w)¸h R (w): As before the envelope conditions imply that
This result enables us to draw conclusions about how the invariant measure over utilities and endowment shocks, © R varies with R: The next result shows that for larger interest rates the invariant measure puts more mass on higher utility entitlements. For every © de…ne the probability measures © Since by Theorem 6 of the main text f© n g converges to ©R in total variation norm, the result then follows.
It will be convenient to de…ne the distribution function associated with any probability measure © Step 1: Let n = 1
where the inequality is due to the fact that g R y (w)¸gR y (w); for all w 2 W:
Step 2: Suppose F y R (w) · F y n¡1 (w); for all w 2 W; all y 2 Y: We want to show that the same is true for n: Note that 
Since for all R; R yd© R is a constant, we focus on the analysis of the …rst part of the excess demand function. From the functional equation
we note that by stationarity and the de…nition of ©
We want to prove that
By the previous lemma for all y 2 Y; © y R stochastically dominates © ŷ R
; and since VR is strictly increasing it follows, using (A56) that
So if we can prove that
we are done. De…ne the sequence fV n g
We will prove by induction that for all n¸1
Since the sequence fV n g 1 n=1 converges uniformly to VR (by Corollary 4 of this appendix), this proves (A62). Let fh n ; g n y 0 g 1 n=1 be the optimal policies associated with fV n g 1 n=1 and (h R ; g R y 0 ) be the optimal choices associated with V R :
Step 1: Let n = 1: By de…nition V 1 = TRV R : Hence
since (h 1 ; g 1 y 0 ) are the minimizing choices associated with V 1 : Integrating with respect to © R and using (A58) and (A59) yields
Step 2:
We want to show that the same is true for n:
by the same reason as in step 1. Again integrating with respect to © R and using (A58) and (A59) we obtain
where the last inequality uses the induction hypothesis
Detailed Proof of Theorem 12 in Main Text
In this subsection we provide a detailed proof of Theorem 12 of the main paper. Proof. It is obvious that the allocation satis…es the resource constraint (9) since the e¢cient allocation by construction satis…es the resource constraint, and £ 0 is derived from © 0 : Also the allocation satis…es the continuing participation constraints, and, by construction of a 0 (w 0 ; y 0 ); the budget constraint. So it remains to be shown that, for almost all (a 0 ; y 0 ), fc t (a 0 ; y t )g is utility maximizing among the allocations satisfying the budget and the continuing participation constraints.
The proof is in two steps. We …rst show that the …rst order conditions
are su¢cient for optimality and we then show that the allocation de…ned above indeed satis…es the …rst order conditions.
Step 1: De…ne
Suppose there exist Lagrange multipliers¸(a 0 ; y 0 ); f¹(a 0 ; y t )g¸0 that jointly with fc t (a 0 ; y t )g satisfy (A68), the budget constraint (7), at prices de…ned in (34), as well as the continuing participation constraints (8)
together with
Now suppose that there is a consumption allocation for individuals of type (a 0 ; y 0 ); fĉ t (a 0 ; y t )g ; that satis…es (7) and (8), and that dominates fc t (a 0 ; y t )g ; i.e.Û(a 0 ; y 0 ) > U (a 0 ; y 0 ); whereÛ (a 0 ; y 0 ) is de…ned analogously to (A69).
a contradiction. The several steps in the argument are justi…ed as follows: (A72) is by de…nition, (A73) will be proved below, (A74) follows from strict concavity of the utility function, (A75) follows from (A68), (A76) from the budget constraint and the fact that u is strictly increasing and prices are strictly positive, and …nally (A77) follows from the budget constraint. Hence there does not exist a consumption allocation fĉ t (a 0 ; y t )g ; that satis…es (7) and (8), and that dominates fc t (a 0 ; y t )g : Now we prove that inequality (A73) holds. For this we …rst note that for all t; y t ; we have
If U (a 0 ; y t ) > U Aut (y t ); then from (A71) it follows that ¹(a 0 ; y t ) = 0; so that (A78) is satis…ed. If U (a 0 ; y t ) = U Aut (y t ); thenÛ (a 0 ; y t ) · U (a 0 ; y t ) and ¹(a 0 ; y t )¸0; and again (A78) holds. Noŵ
. .
Taking limits yieldŝ
We need to show that the last limit is nonpositive. Now note that from (A68)
because, since fc t (a 0 ; y t )g is bounded,
Without loss of generality we can sum only over those elements for which u (ĉ s (a 0 ; y s )) > 0 (it makes the expression only bigger). Theņ
where we used the facts that if we can show that fc t (a 0 ; y t )g is bounded is bounded above by, say ¹ c; and that¯< 1 R : From the budget constraint we know that (given the conjectured equilibrium prices)
Since the utility function satis…es the INADA conditions, there exists c
and we are done.
Step 2: We want to show that there exist Lagrange multipliers¸(a 0 ; y 0 ); f¹(a 0 ; y t g0 that, together with the consumption allocation fc t (a 0 ; y t )g satis…es the …rst order conditions. Let 
with equality if the limited enforcement constraint is not binding in contingency y t+1 : Hence ¹(a 0 ; y t+1 )¸0; and ¹(a 0 ; y t+1 ) = 0 if the constraint is not binding. Obviously the allocation and multipliers satisfy (A68)
The Computational Procedure
In this subsection we describe how, for a parametric class of our economy, we compute a constant R, policy rules h R (w; y); g R y 0 (w; y) and a stationary distribution over utility entitlements and endowment shocks, © R .
Our computational method is an implementation of the policy function iteration algorithm proposed by Coleman (1990) . For a …xed R we search for the optimal policies g y 0 (w; y) and h(w; y) within the class of piecewise-linear functions in w . We start by specifying a k point grid G = fw 0 ; :::; w k g µ D and by guessing the values of a function V To compute the stationary joint measure over (w; y) we proceed as follows: for a given (w; y) we …nd w 4 Note that whenever the …rst order condition does not hold with equality we know that g y 0 (w; y) = U Aut (y 0 ) and we can drop the …rst order condition for the speci…c y 0 as the number of unknowns is reduced by 1: (C(h R (w; y)) ¡ y)© R (w; y)
and use a Newton procedure to …nd R such that d(R) = 0:
